striking results here are obtained by Moore [14] , who finds that ITC decisions are influenced by congressional pressure. Herander and Schwartz [11] find that ITC decisions are inversely related to the number of firms in the petitioning industry, suggesting that greater industry concentration makes it easier to present a more effective case. Both Moore [ 
14] and Baldwin and Steagall [4] find that increases in overall imports or overall import penetration increase the likelihood of affirmative ITC decisions.
What is to be made of all these results? The results indicate that economic criteria play at least a limited role in ITC decisions. Thus it appears that industries with low and declining profitability and declining shipments or employment are more likely to obtain relief. Two aspects of the results for the economic criteria are troubling, however. First, the studies identify different economic criteria as important. Second, the studies find little connection between the injury which is suffered and the imports supposedly responsible for this injury.' Indeed, the results show that increases in overall imports or overall import penetration are far better predictors of affirmative ITC decisions than increases in unfair imports or unfair import penetration. If valid, these findings reduce the U.S. unfair trade laws to a substitute for the escape clause, a practice which is clearly at odds with the GATT.
Previous studies also indicate that non-economic criteria have a significant impact on ITC unfair trade decisions. The results of both Moore [14] and Hansen [9] support the conclusion that certain members of Congress can influence ITC decisions. The findings of Hansen [9] and Finger et al. [7] that industry size influences ITC decisions are also disturbing because they suggest that unfair trade cases are not treated equally, a conclusion which finds additional support in the results of Herander and Schwartz [11] .
In summary, the available evidence indicates that both economic and non-economic criteria play a role in ITC decisions, implying that the ITC does not administer the unfair trade laws in a purely objective or apolitical fashion as it was designed to do. This study attempts to clarify the role of both economic and non-economic criteria in ITC decisions by carefully modeling the methods used by the ITC to evaluate economic criteria. Previous studies have ignored these methods, and as a result, they have not fully identified the role of economic and non-economic criteria in the decisions of the ITC.
The remainder of the paper is comprised of six sections. The second section provides an overview of the ITC and its role in implementing the U.S. antidumping and antisubsidy laws. The third section describes the methodology used by the ITC in its antidumping and antisubsidy decisions. The fourth and fifth sections describe the data used in the study and the econometric model. The final two sections contain the results and conclusions of the paper.
II. The ITC and the U.S. Antidumping and Antisubsidy Laws
The ITC is an independent, quasi-judicial government agency which has several other functions in addition to its role as administrator of the U.S. unfair trade laws. Some of these functions include monitoring import levels, analyzing trade policy issues and providing recommendations to the president on certain trade policy questions. The ITC consists of 6 commissioners and a support staff of economists, lawyers and other personnel. The commissioners are appointed by the president and approved by Congress. Under normal circumstances, each commissioner serves one nine-year term which cannot be renewed. The commissioners are responsible for the antidumping and antisubsidy decisions of the ITC as well as for ITC decisions involving a number of other trade matters. Each ITC decision is based on a simple vote with the majority opinion prevailing. 2 The role of the ITC in U.S. antidumping and antisubsidy investigations is to determine whether dumped or subsidized imports materially injure or threaten to materially injure a U.S. industry.3 Each antidumping or antisubsidy case involves a preliminary ruling by the ITC on whether there is a reasonable indication that dumped or subsidized imports have caused or threaten to cause material injury. If the ITC's preliminary ruling is negative, the case is dismissed; if the ruling is affirmative, the case continues. During the sample period considered here, approximately 15% of the ITC's preliminary decisions were negative.
If the ITC makes an affirmative preliminary decision, the case is then passed over to the International Trade Administration (ITA), an agency of the Department of Commerce. The role of the ITA is to determine whether dumping or subsidization has occurred, and if so, to what extent. If the ITA finds that dumping or subsidization has taken place, then the ITC must render a final decision on the case. If this decision is affirmative, antidumping or countervailing duties will be levied. If the ITC's final decision is negative, the case is dismissed.
The economic criteria upon which ITC decisions are supposed to be based vary depending on the nature of the injury facing the domestic industry. Different criteria exist for the case in which the domestic industry is experiencing material injury and for the case in which the domestic industry is threatened with material injury. In cases involving actual material injury, the commission is directed by law to consider changes in the following variables: output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, capacity utilization, investment, return on investment, prices, cash 2. In the case of a tie, the affirmative opinion prevails. 3. The U.S. antidumping and antisubsidy laws also provide relief to domestic industries whose establishment is materially retarded by dumped or subsidized imports. In practice, cases involving material retardation are rare, and as a result, material retardation is not considered further in this paper. flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, and the industry's ability to raise capital. Also to be considered are changes in the volume and value of the unfair imports, the market penetration of the unfair imports, and the price of these imports. In addition, the law also allows each commissioner to examine any other "relevant economic factors."
In cases involving the threat of material injury, the criteria set out by the unfair trade laws include, among other things, the nature of the subsidy (if a subsidy is involved), the potential for increases in foreign productive capacity, any unused foreign capacity, the likelihood of foreign product line shifts, and any substantial increase in importer's inventories.
III. The Bifurcated Approach
Although ITC commissioners analyze economic criteria using several different methods, the dominant approach over the last decade has been the bifurcated approach. Bifurcated decisions accounted for about 80% of the decisions reached during the sample period, and because of this, the bifurcated approach is the only approach considered further in this paper.4
The bifurcated approach involves a two stage decision making process which is illustrated in Figure 1 . In the first stage, commissioners determine whether a domestic industry has been materially injured. In the second stage, commissioners determine whether unfair imports are a cause of material injury. If both decisions are affirmative, duties are levied. If there is no material injury to the domestic industry or if the unfair imports are not viewed as a cause of material injury, it must then be determined whether the unfair imports threaten material injury. If so, duties are levied; if not, the case is dismissed. This paper differs from all previous work in that it models bifurcation. To see the importance of modeling bifurcation, consider the following two cases. In the first case, suppose there is material injury to a domestic industry but the dumped or subsidized imports are not found to be a cause of that injury and are not found to threaten additional injury (so the ultimate decision in the case is negative.) If bifurcation is not modeled, the data on the status of the domestic industry (which indicate material injury) will seem to conflict with the final decision (which is negative). Thus unless bifurcation is modeled, it will appear that the economic criteria are being misused.
In the second case, suppose a petition is dismissed because the domestic industry is not materially injured. Under these circumstances, no decision on whether the unfair imports are a cause of material injury is necessary since there is no material injury. Since there is no causation decision, no statement can be made about the variables which enter into this decision. If bifurcation is not accounted for, however, the variables which relate to causation are treated as if they affected the final negative decision. Both of these cases demonstrate how ignoring bifurcation can produce misleading results. This study also differs from other studies in that affirmative ITC decisions based on the threat 5. It has been argued that ITC decisions are more likely to be political in cases where the economic data are confidential. To test this argument, I compared the percentage of affirmative decisions from the sample with economic data with this same percentage from a separate sample in which no economic data were publicly available. The new sample consisted of 78 observations drawn from the same sample period. The difference between the two means was not statistically significant. I also computed the same percentages from each sample conditional on some political representation, and again found no statistically significant difference. Finally, I ran a logit regression in the sample with no economic data using individual commissioner votes as the dependent variable and political variables and fixed effects as independent variables. None of the political variables were significant. While these results are far from conclusive, they suggest that ITC decisions are not more political in cases where the economic data are confidential.
6. Baldwin and Steagall [4] find evidence that the ITC uses different economic criteria in antidumping and antisubsidy cases. Unfortunately, the number of antisubsidy cases in my sample is too small for me to conduct a separate analysis of the two different types of cases.
7. Cumulation has been virtually mandatory since 1984. 8. In only one multi-petition case in the sample did commissioners vote affirmatively for one country and negatively for another. In this case, imports from the two countries were sufficiently different so that cumulation was not mandatory. I treat these two cases as distinct in the sample because of this. It should be noted that commissioners have often split their votes on multi-petition cases when a threat of material injury is posed by one or more countries but not by others. As was discussed earlier, however, threat rulings have been excluded from the sample so this is not an issue.
9. Some differences do exist in the data used for individual countries in multi-petition cases. Most notably, the dumping or subsidy margins frequently differ significantly. To control for these differences, I take a weighted average of these margins, using the fraction of total unfair imports as weights.
10. Consider, for example, a recent case involving fresh cut flowers. In this case, which involved imports from ten different countries, three commissioners found seven different "like" products, each of which required separate votes. If all of these votes were included in the sample, this one petition would have accounted for 114 separate commissioner votes. Using my approach, this number is reduced to 23. The independent variables used in the analysis are listed in table I and are described in greater detail in the appendix. The independent variables which reflect the economic criteria employed by the ITC commissioners include percentage changes in profit rates, domestic market share, and production, as well as percentage changes in the volume and market share of the unfair imports." Also included among the economic criteria are a number of variables not specifically mentioned in the legislation. These variables include the domestic industry's profit rate and market share, the dumping or subsidy margin, and the market share of unfair imports. These variables, while not cited in the legislation, are frequently mentioned in the opinions of a number of commissioners and one would be hard-pressed to argue that they are not "relevant economic factors" and thus consistent with the legislation.
ECONOMICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
The non-economic criteria included in the study were selected to test three hypotheses which have found support in previous work. The first hypothesis is that industry size affects the amount of political pressure which can be applied to regulatory agencies. The results of Moore [14] and Herander and Schwartz [11] support the pressure group argument of Pincus [15] , which is that smaller, more concentrated industries are better able to overcome coordination problems and hence can lobby more effectively. Hansen [9] , Finger, Hall, and Nelson [7] , and Baldwin and Steagall [4] find support for the argument of Caves [5] , which is that larger industries with greater 11. Changes in domestic production and employment were highly correlated in the sample, giving rise to multicollinearity problems. In order to avoid these problems, I include only changes in domestic production. To control for the fact that the data set pools the votes of different commissioners, commissioner-specific fixed effects are introduced. Discrepancies between the injury thresholds of different commissioners have been well documented in previous work, and these discrepancies are captured here by fixed effects. Commissioners Brunsdale, Eckes, Liebeler, Lodwick, Rohr, and Newquist are represented respectively by the fixed effects BRU, ECK, LIE, LOD, NEW, and ROH.
See Herander and Pupp [10] and Herander and Schwartz [11]
. Preliminary results using all firms rather than just active firms support this argument. In particular, the coefficient on the "all firm" version of SN was found to be negative at very high significance levels for several specifications of the model.
V. Econometric Modeling
Because the dependent variable are qualitative and because bifurcated decisions involve two stages, a sequential logit model was selected for the analysis. A sequential logit model is appropriate only if the decisions concerning material injury and causation are independent. This appears to be the case since material injury decisions seem to be based on data for the domestic industry while causation decisions seem to be based on data for the unfair imports.
Let Xij represent the (k x 1) vector of independent variables which summarizes the condition of the domestic industry in case i for commissioner j (including fixed effects) and let Zij represent the (1 x 1) vector of independent variables used to address the question of causation in case i for commissioner j (again including fixed effects). The probability of an affirmative material injury decision by commissioner j in case i (denoted AMIDij) is then given by
while the probability of an affirmative causation decision by commissioner j in case i (denoted
ACDij) can be written as P(ACDijXij,Zij) = [1/(1 + e a Zij)lP(AMIDij). (2)

Given the independence between the material injury and causation decisions, the (k x 1) and (1 x 1) parameter vectors /3 and a can be estimated by maximizing the likelihood functions of two successive dichotomous logit models (See Amemiya [2] or Maddala [13] for some examples).
In the first case, represented by (1), the parameters relevant to the material injury decision are estimated using the entire data set. In the second case, represented by (2), the parameters relevant to the causation decision are estimated using the subset of cases in which material injury is present.
VI. Results
The econometric results are presented in Tables II through V. Tables II and III contain Table II first, note that 18 of the 20 coefficients in models 2 through 5 have negative signs and that all the statistically significant coefficients have negative signs. The economic variables which are significant include the domestic indus- try's profit rate, its market share, and changes in its market share and its production. Changes in profitability are not significant. The explanatory power of the economic variables is quite high. A log likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the economic coefficients in models 2 or 3 are all zero is easily rejected in both cases at the 0.5% significance level. Furthermore, McFadden's R2, which provides a rough measure of fit, jumps from 0.02 to about 0.30, indicating that the inclusion of the economic criteria improves the fit of both models substantially. Finally, the percentage of correct predictions rises from 74.7% to about 83% after the economic criteria are included. Clearly economic criteria do influence material injury decisions.
The results for the non-economic criteria (see models 4 and 5 in Table II Table II . The results, which are presented in Table III , indicate that the domestic industry's profit rate and its market share have the greatest effect on ITC material injury decisions. The elasticities associated with the other variables are relatively small, indicating that these variables, while significant, are of lesser importance in ITC material injury decisions. In summary, both economic and non-economic variables influence ITC material injury determinations. Two economic variables, the domestic industry's profit rate and its market share, appear to be the most important determinants of ITC material injury decisions. Other economic variables which are important include the rate of change in domestic market share and the rate of change in domestic production. All of these variables enter into the material injury decisions of the ITC in a way which is consistent with the unfair trade legislation. The only non-economic factor which is important is industry size, which is positively related to the probability of an affirmative material injury decision. No support for congressional dominance is found.
Tables IV and V contain the results for the second stage of the bifurcated decision, which determines whether the unfair imports are a cause of material injury to the domestic industry. If the ITC uses economic criteria appropriately in its causation decisions, increases in the volume and market share of the unfair imports should increase the probability of an affirmative decision and hence the coefficients on these variables should be positive. Greater unfair import penetration and higher dumping or subsidy margins should also increase the likelihood of an affirmative decision and hence the coefficients on these variables should be positive as well. If the antidumping and antisubsidy laws are being used by the ITC as substitutes for the escape clause, then signifi- 13 . This result is not a product of the way SN and HN are constructed. Using the same dummy variables as Moore [14] , I find no evidence of congressional dominance in either the material injury or causation decisions. Using the same variables as Hansen [9] , I find that her version of HN is significant and positive, but only in the material injury decision. The impact of HN on ITC material injury decisions (as measured by its elasticity) is, however, quite small. Furthermore, defining SN in the same way, I find that this variable is highly significant and negative in the material injury decision, a result that is completely contrary to congressional dominance. where Xijk gives the value of the kth independent variable in case i for commissionerj and Pij gives the probability of an affirmative material injury decision in case i for commissionerj.
cant and increasing fair import penetration should raise the probability of an affirmative decision, so FAIRMS, SRFAIR, and LRFAIR should have positive coefficients if this hypothesis is correct. Examination of Table IV reveals that two of the economic variables have a significant impact on causation decisions. The first is the dumping or subsidy margin and the second is the market share of unfair imports. The signs of the coefficients on both of these variables are positive, implying that cases involving higher dumping or subsidy margins and greater unfair import penetration are more likely to be affirmed, a result which is consistent with the unfair trade legislation.'4 Neither changes in unfair import penetration nor changes in the volume of unfair imports appear to be important in ITC causation decisions. When the economic criteria alone are used to explain the causation decision (see models 2 and 3 in Table IV) , they raise McFadden's R2 from 0.2 to 0.5 and thus significantly improve the fit of both equations. Adding the economic criteria also increases the percentage of correct predictions from 76% to 86%. Thus economic criteria appear to be important in ITC causation decisions. This conclusion is reinforced by the elasticity estimates provided in Table V . These estimates indicate that a one percent increase in the dumping margin or the market share of the unfair imports increases the probability of an affirmative causation decision by roughly one quarter of one percent. Non-economic criteria appear to have little impact on the causation decision (see models 4 and 5 in Table IV .) Using a log likelihood ratio test, the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients on the non-economic variables equal zero cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level. Perhaps the most surprising result in light of previous work is that fairly traded imports appear 14 . The significance of the dumping or subsidy margin is quite surprising given the fact that several commissioners claim not to use margins in their decisions. This result holds even when the principle proponents of margins (Brunsdale and Liebeler) are eliminated from the sample. One explanation for this result is that the dumping margin serves as a proxy for the amount by which the unfair imports undersell domestic producers. The amount of underselling is repeatedly cited as important in the opinions of commissioners who do not favor the use of margins. where Zijk gives the value of the kth independent variable in case i for commissioner j and Pij gives the probability of an affirmative causation decision in case i for commissionerj.
to have little impact on the causation decision. Indeed, even when the coefficient on the market share of fairly traded imports is significant (and it is only marginally so), it has the wrong sign. This is in sharp contrast to the results of previous studies. Another interesting feature of the causation results is that VAL (the value of domestic shipments) is no longer significant. The coefficient on this variable is positive and highly significant in the material injury decision, indicating that larger industries are more likely to receive favorable material injury decisions. One explanation for the loss of significance is that industries which make it through the material injury stage have the ability to lobby the ITC effectively. Since larger industries have greater access to resources, they will in general be able to lobby the ITC more effectively and hence are more likely to receive affirmative material injury decisions. Larger industries do not appear to have an advantage in the causation decision, however, because all industries (large or small) that make it past the material injury decision have demonstrated an ability to lobby the ITC effectively. This result is in keeping with the results of Herander and Pupp [10] , who find that the ability to lobby the ITC effectively is important in determining who receives relief in steel unfair trade cases. It also suggests that some smaller industries may have been denied relief because they lacked the resources to adequately present their complaints.
In summary, the evidence presented here indicates that at least some of the economic criteria are used appropriately in the causation decisions of the ITC commissioners. The two variables which are most significant are the market share of unfair imports and the dumping or subsidy margin. Perhaps equally important, non-economic criteria do not appear to influence ITC commissioners at this stage of the decision-making process.
VII. Conclusion
This study attempts to determine the importance of economic and non-economic criteria in the antidumping and antisubsidy decisions of the ITC. The study is novel in that it models the methods used by the ITC commissioners to reach their decisions. These methods have been ignored in previous work.
The econometric results strongly support the hypothesis that economic criteria are used appropriately by the ITC commissioners. Key explanatory variables include the profit rate and market share of the domestic industry, the change in domestic production, the dumping or subsidy The dependent variables were all taken from the opinions of the commissioners, which are included in the final report. As was mentioned in the text, the dependent variables represent the votes of the commissioners on issues pertaining only to actual material injury caused by the dumped or subsidized imports and not to any threat of material injury. While considerable care was exercised in collecting the votes, some ambiguities did arise and these should be mentioned. In a number of cases, commissioners offered bifurcated opinions in which they ruled negatively on both material injury and causation. These rulings appear to be inconsistent with bifurcation because the absence of material injury to the domestic industry makes any ruling on causation unnecessary. This inconsistency is cleared up by noting that the causation analysis is included for the sake of argument or for the sake of completeness. The commissioners themselves state repeatedly that the causation analysis is offered "assuming arguendo" that the domestic industry is materially injured. In some cases, commissioners who normally used bifurcation were unable to come to any conclusion concerning the status of the domestic industry. In these cases, their votes were dropped from the sample.
Finally, it is not necessarily true that each commissioner cast only one vote (or one sequence of votes) in each case or that each commissioner casts the same number of votes in each case. In cases in which a commissioner finds more than one "like product", that commissioner must vote on each of the like products. As an example, consider a case involving flowers from Colombia. In that case, Commissioners Eckes, Lodwick and Rohr found that there were seven like products, and thus each cast seven votes, one for each like product. Commissioners Brunsdale and Liebeler found only one like product and thus voted only once on this product.
Consider next the independent variables. Domestic profit rates were obtained by taking the ratio of operating income to net sales. Both domestic and foreign market share data are based on the volume of shipments wherever possible. When data on the volume of shipments was not available, market shares were based on the value of shipments. The dumping and subsidy margins were taken directly from the reports. In several cases, a specific rather than ad valorem margin was given. These cases were dropped. The market share of dumped or subsidized imports (FMS) as well as any changes in import volumes were adjusted to allow for the cumulation of imports. Cumulation takes place in cases involving dumped or subsidized imports from more than one country. In these cases, if the imports are sufficiently similar, the ITC must cumulatively assess the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. This means that for the purposes of addressing causation, the import shares must be combined across some or all of the countries involved in the investigation.
Both the variables HN and SN were constructed using a detailed atlas, Ward's Business Directory [17],
Congressional Districts in the 1980s [6]
, and the Almanac of American Politics [1] in conjunction with the location of "active" firms provided in the ITC reports. In a few cases, the number of domestic producers was so large that they were not listed individually. In these cases, only those domestic producers who served as witnesses for the petitioner at the ITC hearings or who were identified as supporting the petition in the ITC report were used in the construction of HN or SN.
